Cryptanalysis and improvement of a quantum secret sharing scheme based on x-type entangled states

In the paper [2010 Chin. Phys. B 19 050306], Yang et al. put forward a novel three-party quantum secret sharing protocol of secure direct communication based on χ-type entangled states, they claimed that the scheme is secure. However, in this paper, we study the security of the protocol and find that it is insecure. Applying intercept and resend attack, the agent Bob can obtain Alice’s secret without the help from the other agent Charlie. In the end, we give our effective modification for its improvement.     

Temperature dependence of the P-hit single event transient pulse width in a three-transistor inverter chain

A comparison of the temperature dependence of the P-hit single event transient (SET) in a two-transistor (2T) inverter with that in a three-transistor (3T) inverter is carried out based on a three-dimensional numerical simulation.Due to the significantly distinct mechanisms of the single event change collection in the 2T and the 3T inverters,the temperature plays different roles in the SET production and propagation.The SET pulse will be significantly broadened in the 2T inverter chain while will be compressed in the 3T inverter chain as temperature increases.The investigation provides a new insight into the SET mitigation under the extreme environment,where both the high temperature and the single event effects should be considered.The 3T inverter layout structure (or similar layout structures) will be a better solution for spaceborne integrated circuit design for extreme environments.     

Duopoly information sharing with differentiated products

Consider a model where firms own the same technology in linear Cournot duopolies with differentiated products and the slope of the demand curve facing the firm is unknown, containing an own-price effect and a cross-effect. We discuss as follows: whether there is an incentive to share information when firms are symmetrically informed about the random demand. In a two-stage game, for independent goods and complements, it is a Nash equilibrium for firms to put their private information in a common pool.     

Optimal risk transfer for agents with germs

We introduce a new class of risk measures called generalized entropic risk measures (GERMS) that allow economic agents to have different attitudes towards different sources of risk. We formulate the problem of optimal risk transfer in terms of these risk measures and characterize the optimal transfer contract. The optimal contract involves what we call intertemporal source-dependent quotient sharing, where agents linearly share changes in the aggregate risk reserve that occur in response to shocks to the system over time, with scaling coefficients that depend on the attitudes of each agent towards the source of risk causing the shock. Generalized entropic risk measures are not dilations of a common base risk measure, so our results extend the class of risk measures for which explicit characterizations of the optimal transfer contract can be found.     

Optimal seat allocation for two-flight problems with a flexible demand segment

In this paper, we study a two-flight model where there are two flights between two cities in a day (e.g., one departs at 9:00 am and another at 11:00 am) and booking requests in each fare class arrive according to a random process. There are three types of booking requests: the first and second types are respectively for the first and the second flight only; whereas the third type is flexible and willing to take either flight. Upon receiving a booking request, the airline has to decide whether to accept it, and in case a third type is accepted, which flight to accommodate it. This paper uncovers the structure of optimal booking policies through four monotone switching curves. We also present an extension of the basic model to multiple-flight case. Finally, a numerical example is used to illustrate the derivation and the dynamics of the optimal booking policies.     

Effects of knowledge spillover on inter-organizational resource sharing decision in collaborative knowledge creation

Collaborative knowledge creation is important for firms to gain new competitive advantages, but knowledge outgoing spillover harms their existing competitive advantages, which puts them into a dilemma when investing R&D resources. This study formalizes and investigates this dilemma using the Stackelberg leader–follower framework. Through our analyses, we find that, (1) current knowledge creation efforts and prior knowledge are substitutable in collaborative knowledge creation, and through controlling the ratio of current knowledge creation efforts to prior knowledge invested, the leader and the follower can gain benefits from collaboration and restrict knowledge outgoing spillover simultaneously; (2) because the leader invests resources first and faces moral hazards, it has the incentives to participate in collaborative knowledge creation only when its benefits from collaborative knowledge creation fruits and knowledge incoming spillover are bigger than those of the follower, and the more moral hazards it confronts, the more it demands; (3) the leader and the follower invest resources at ratios consistent with the benefits and costs the resources bring to them if they can determine the amount, or the collaboration is unstable.     

Repeated newsvendor game with transshipments under dual allocations

We study a repeated newsvendor game with transshipments. In every period n retailers face a stochastic demand for an identical product and independently place their inventory orders before demand realization. After observing the actual demand, each retailer decides how much of her leftover inventory or unsatisfied demand she wants to share with the other retailers. Residual inventories are then transshipped in order to meet residual demands, and dual allocations are used to distribute residual profit. Unsold inventories are salvaged at the end of the period. While in a single-shot game retailers in an equilibrium withhold their residuals, we show that it is a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium for the retailers to share all of the residuals when the discount factor is large enough and the game is repeated infinitely many times. We also study asymptotic behavior of the retailers’ order quantities and discount factors when n is large. Finally, we provide conditions under which a system-optimal solution can be achieved in a game with n retailers, and develop a contract for achieving a system-optimal outcome when these conditions are not satisfied.     

基于需求和生产成本偏差的Cournot竞争供应链协调

分析一个供应商和两个Cournot竞争零售商组成的供应链系统的协调问题.首先证明收益共享合约在稳定条件下能实现该供应链协调;当突发事件导致零售商面临的需求规模和供应商的生产成本同时与其预测值发生偏差时,为使供应链收益最大,提出了调整生产计划和零售价格的协调策略,进一步证明了改进的收益共享合约可协调需求和成本偏差的分权供应链;最后进行了数值实验.     

Manufacturer-buyer coordination for newsvendor-type-products with two ordering opportunities and partial backorders

In a recent paper [Weng, Z.K., 2004. Coordinating order quantities between the manufacturer and the buyer: A generalized newsvendor model. European Journal of Operational Research 156, 148–161], a newsvendor-type coordination model was developed for a single-manufacturer single-buyer channel with two ordering opportunities. This paper further extends the model to the case where the excess demand after the first order is partially backlogged and both parties share the manufacturing setup cost of the second order (if happened). We show that the decentralized system would perform best if the manufacturer covers utterly the second production setup cost, which is opposite to that obtained in Weng (2004). Another extension in the present paper is that in the centralized system, the second order decision is made by the buyer based on the channel’s benefit rather than based on the buyer’s benefit as in Weng (2004). It is proved that the expected profit of the system in our paper is always larger than that in Weng (2004). In order to maximize the expected profit of the channel, two coordinated policies are proposed to achieve perfect coordination: a two-part-tariff policy for the special case that the buyer pays all the manufacturing setup cost, and a revised revenue-sharing contract for the case that two parties share the manufacturing setup cost.     

Batch processor sharing with hyper-exponential service time

We study the Processor Sharing queueing model with a hyper-exponential service time distribution and Poisson batch arrival process. In the case of the hyper-exponential service time distribution we find an analytical expression for the expected conditional response time function and obtain an alternative proof of its concavity with respect to the service time.